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Abstract
This work reports on the author’s experience designing, implementing, and formally verifying a low-level
piece of system software. The timing model and the adaptation of an existing information ﬂow policy to a
monadic framework are reasonably novel. Interactive compilation through equational rewriting worked well
in practice. Finally, the project uncovered some potential areas for improving interactive theorem provers.
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1 Introduction
Since system software underlies practically all applications and robust applications
require robust foundations, the construction of robust system software is impor-
tant. Constructing software out of small components of limited functionality keeps
the complexity of any individual component manageable. The principle of least
privilege dictates that designs reduce the number of components whose correct op-
eration is critical. Formal veriﬁcation of these few small components is both feasible
and worthwhile. This document discusses the design and veriﬁcation of one such
component.
The particular system is a multi-level secure remote-mountable ﬁle server. Since
the networked ﬁle server connects to multiple networks each operating at a single
security level, the server integrates into the existing network infrastructure of orga-
nizations currently using (mostly) separate networks to maintain data separation.
The main theorem proved relates to information ﬂow. Speciﬁcally, each network
has an assigned label from a partially ordered set of labels. For each label, all obser-
vations made at an interface with that label depend only on inputs from interfaces
whose labels are less than or equal to the label in question.
This paper also touches on a number of techniques used or hurdles overcome
during the project. It describes the author’s experience embedding a low-level lan-
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Fig. 1. Internal Architecture
guage in higher-order logic using monads, reasoning about the embedded programs,
and connecting those programs to an implementation. The work presents a mod-
iﬁed formalization of non-interference more suited to programs with non-inverted
control ﬂow and weakened to allow for timing variations. Finally, it suggests a few
areas where tool improvements could help future eﬀorts of similar nature.
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents
the internal system architecture. Section 3 provides an overview of the modeling
approach. Section 4 focuses on the model of the environment surrounding the soft-
ware. Section 5 explains the proven properties of the system. Section 6 outlines
the general proof technique. Section 7 describes some manually applied transfor-
mations in order to better match the capabilities of the theorem prover. Section 8
explains the derivation of a low-level model fairly close to the ﬁnal implementation.
Section 9 discusses the steps taken to produce the implementation from the low-
level model. Section 10 describes property-based and model-based testing of the
implementation. Section 11 discusses various improvements that may be helpful in
the future. Section 12 concludes.
2 Internal Architecture
Figure 1 depicts the internal process architecture of the system. The system services
each network with a front end process that consists of a user-mode network stack
and a network-enabled ﬁle system. Each front end interfaces to the persistent data
storage through the block access controller. Since this is the only component in
the system that spans multiple security levels, it is the only user-level component
requiring formal veriﬁcation. Since the project relies on another organization’s
separation kernel supporting the GWV security policy [8], the remainder of this
paper focuses on the block access controller.
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3 Modeling Overview
Low-level system software involves many imperative eﬀects including state updates,
input, and output. Some behaviors of various hardware devices are at best diﬃcult
to formally specify or, even worse, explicitly documented as unspeciﬁed. The logic
used for the project, namely Isabelle [11]’s higher-order logic [7], lacks direct support
for such impure operations. The project bridges this gap via a shallowly-embedded
domain-speciﬁc programming language suitable for constructing low-level system
software. Monads provide a convenient formalism for structuring denotational se-
mantics so that one may program directly with the denotations [14]. Indeed the
Haskell programming language pioneered this approach which is now regularly used.
Section 4 further describes the monadic type, including its mutable state, I/O, and
unspeciﬁed error state.
Another issue with modeling system software is that higher-order logic functions
are total, while most system software does not terminate. The program transfor-
mations mentioned in section 7 (informally) transform the interactive program into
a terminating reaction function surrounded by a single outermost non-terminating
reaction loop. This terminating reaction function, step, then formally models the
software component as a transition system.
Thus, the block access controller’s step function has approximately the following
interface.
step :: “conﬁg ⇒ unit m”
That is, the step function consumes a conﬁguration which speciﬁes statically
conﬁgured details about the number of interfaces, labels associated with them, and
the partial order between the labels. It then produces a monadic computation with
no useful return value (i.e. of type unit). As in Haskell, even though the main
function has type IO (), the intermediate computations combined with the monadic
bind operator do produce useful results.
While reasoning directly in higher-order logic works well in many situations,
properties about essentially imperative monadic computations can beneﬁt from a
Hoare-like logic. Since higher-order logic easily embeds other logics, this is a simple
task. The predicate “prePost c p q x” consumes some static conﬁguration informa-
tion (c), a precondition (p) over the pre-state, a post condition (q) over the value
produced by the monadic computation and over the post-state, and the monadic
computation itself (x). The predicate roughly means that every possible run of the
monadic computation starting from a start state satisfying the precondition results
in a well-speciﬁed state that satisﬁes the post condition.
4 Environment Model
One of the challenges in formal veriﬁcation is modeling the environment in which
the formally modeled component executes. In this case, all interactions between
the program and its environment occur by the program executing primitive non-
proper morphisms of monadic type. The environment consists of hardware devices
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numIvec :: “(nat, σ) m”
numOvec :: “(nat, σ) m”
numDvec :: “(nat, σ) m”
numDisk :: “(nat, σ) m”
diskSize :: “diskIndex ⇒ (nat, σ) m”
ivecRef :: “ivecIndex ⇒ nat ⇒ (byte, σ) m”
ovecRef :: “ovecIndex ⇒ nat ⇒ (byte, σ) m”
ovecSet :: “ovecIndex ⇒ nat ⇒ byte ⇒ (unit, σ) m”
dvecRef :: “dvecIndex ⇒ nat ⇒ (byte, σ) m”
dvecSet :: “dvecIndex ⇒ nat ⇒ byte ⇒ (unit, σ) m”
dvecBusy :: “dvecIndex ⇒ (bool, σ) m”
numPending :: “diskIndex ⇒ (nat, σ) m”
startDma :: “diskIndex ⇒ dvecIndex ⇒ bool ⇒ blockId ⇒ nBlock ⇒ (unit, σ) m”
Fig. 2. Monadic Primitives
and interprocess communication channels. Since both the hardware devices and
other processes operate in an asynchronous concurrent manner, the complexity of
the system could increase dramatically without a carefully chosen model of time.
Figure 2 presents three groups of monadic primitives related to I/O. The ﬁrst
group of primitives simply report the number of input, output and DMA buﬀers,
the number of disks, and the capacities of the disks in blocks respectively. 1 The
second group of primitives read a byte from or write a byte to input output and
DMA buﬀers or check if a DMA buﬀer is busy. The ﬁnal two primitives check
the number of DMA requests currently in ﬂight for a given disk or initiate a new
DMA transfer. The next two subsections discuss the shared memory interprocess
communication model and the disk model further.
4.1 Interprocess Communication Model
The block access controller interfaces with other software processes through shared
memory pages. Each shared memory page is either readable and writable by the
block access controller and read-only by the other process or read-only by the block
access controller and may be both read and written by the other process. The model
treats each direction separately.
For input buﬀers an oracle function determines the value of the input. The
question, however, is choosing the parameter of the input oracle. On what do the
input bytes depend? They actually depend on the other processes, including what
those other processes have read from the block access controller. Modeling all of
those factors in detail would be inconvenient at best. Instead, a byte read is a func-
tion of the memory page being read, the oﬀset within that page, and some notion of
time. What is an appropriate notion of time? In a small step operational semantics,
the number of reductions could model time. This is unnecessary since the amount
1 The extra type variable σ parameterizes the state space. It can be largely ignored, although it helped
eliminate frame conditions by restricting access to the state space within various computations.
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by which we increase the time argument between reads is irrelevant as long as it
changes. Using the total number of bytes read from any oﬀset on any memory page
would not work well. If the number of bytes read from a supposedly unobservable
memory page inﬂuenced the values of the bytes read from an observable memory
page, then the information ﬂow policy would be false. Is this a legitimate problem,
or a spurious ﬂow of information due to a modeling error? Since each execution
of the step function is short enough to ﬁnish within a single time slice and since
none of the processes are scheduled simultaneously, the input values across all input
pages remain stable throughout a reaction. Feeding the reaction number into the
input oracle is a reasonable choice. This assumption that the input buﬀers remain
completely invariant during a reaction is a stronger assumption than actually re-
quired. Instead, the model assumes that every time the system reads a byte from an
oﬀset within a given input page it reads a (potentially) fresh value, but that value
is independent of any of the other inputs or the amount of unrelated computation
performed. Thus the part of the state space related to input stores a two dimen-
sional array of natural numbers, i.e. “time array array”. The input oracle has type
“(time ⇒ byte) array array”.
Output is somewhat simpler than input. The program can read the memory
it wrote, so the model stores the output bytes on each output page as an array in
the state space. It also, however, stores a history variable that records the trace of
all instructions executed that wrote a byte to an output array. This may not be
necessary; recording the output state at the end of each reaction would suﬃce. On
the other hand, making a stronger claim that even if an attacker could see the order
in which the block access controller wrote all the bytes to the output page during
a reaction, the attacker could still not glean any information about requests from
unobservable channels.
4.2 Disk Model
The main issue in modeling hard disks is the asynchronous nature of DMA. While
using synchronous disk operations would have greatly simpliﬁed the system, the
performance would likely suﬀer unacceptably. DMA, like shared memory inter-
process communication, must be modeled with care in order to reason about the
interleaved concurrent actions at a granularity coarser than individual memory bus
cycles. The key idea is that as long as nobody is looking, the extent to which the
DMA transfer completed so far remains irrelevant. The two primitive non-proper
morphisms for reading a byte from a DMA buﬀer and for writing a byte to a DMA
buﬀer both check if any disk is currently using that buﬀer for a DMA transfer. If
so, the operation transitions to the unspeciﬁed error state.
There is also a distinction between a buﬀer not being in use vs being known to
not be in use. It is at least ideologically incorrect for a program to initiate a DMA
transfer and then access the DMA buﬀer without checking for the transfer’s com-
pletion even if the transfer has actually completed. Therefore the program initiated
check for DMA completion also performs the actual transfer upon completion. In
eﬀect, the trickle of concurrent DMA data transfer becomes one large synchronous
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and atomic transfer at a later point in the program’s execution.
To support this model of DMA, the model of each disk contains two pieces of
actual state and two ﬁctitious pieces of state used for modeling time. The ﬁrst
actual piece of state is an array of disk blocks where each block is an array of bytes.
This is the state one normally thinks of as the state of a disk. In addition, each
disk has a queue of pending DMA requests paired with time stamps. Also, for the
sake of modeling timing, the disk maintains the history of all requests sent to the
disk and the total number of times the program has checked for DMA completion.
Initiating a new DMA transfer checks that all the indices are in bounds and that
the buﬀer is not used by any other active transfers. It then wraps its arguments up
in a pending request structure. Next it passes this structure, the disk number, the
history of all prior requests to the disk, the current pending requests, and the total
number of completion checks to a disk timing oracle. The timing oracle returns a
completion time. The model adds this time to the maximum completion time for
requests already in progress in order to assure monotonicity, which the advanced
host controller serial ATA interface guarantees about hard disks.
5 Policy
A central goal of the system—and of the block access controller—is the prevention of
information leakage. A signiﬁcant lemma necessary for reasoning about other prop-
erties is that the system behavior is well speciﬁed. The proof regarding information
ﬂow then relies on the facts established during the safety proof.
5.1 Safety Policy
The safety property states the invariance of the goodState predicate with respect
to the step function.
prePost c (goodState c) (λv. goodState c) (repeat n (step c))
The use of prePost also asserts that the result is not the unspeciﬁed state. If
running a monadic computation does not result in the unspeciﬁed error state, then
none of the intermediate computations did either. This is due to the monadic bind
operation propagating the unspeciﬁed state, which is easy to prove. Demonstrating
that none of the shallowly embedded language constructs can catch the abortive
nature of an unspeciﬁed computation requires an inspection of all the uses of the
primitive monadic data constructor to check for catch-like non-proper morphisms.
While inconvenient, at least the task remains relatively straightforward.
The goodState predicate contains a number of invariants. Arrays must be the
proper size for the given conﬁguration. Queues of partially processed requests must
have resulted from legitimate requests. As an example, for each in-ﬂight request to
send a data block to an interprocess communication channel the receiving channel
must be authorized to read that data block.
As an aside, the sequential composition rule for Hoare logic (adjusted for a
P. Graunke / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 187–202192
monadic setting) oﬀers a cleaner alternative to disjunctive invariants. A disjunctive
invariant is typically applied uniformly throughout the program, but the ﬁrst con-
junct of each disjunct serves as a guard based on an encoding of the control ﬂow as
a data value. They often have a form similar to the following.
P x = atProgramPointA x ∧ P1 x ∨ atProgramPointB x ∧ P2 x
Instead of encoding the control state of the program as data, the following Hoare-
style rule for reasoning about the monadic bind operation directly supports diﬀerent
predicates for diﬀerent control ﬂow points.
lemma prePostBind
: “[[prePost c p q x; ∀v. prePost c (q v) r (y v)]] =⇒ prePost c p r (x = y)”
This prePostBind rule includes an arbitrary predicate q over the intermediate
state. Thus, the pre and post conditions p and r might both be goodState while q
may be some other predicate. For example, two queues may normally need to have
equal length, but immediately after updating one queue and before updating the
other to match the lengths diﬀer by one. Thus, the logic handles diﬀerent invariants
at diﬀerent points in the control ﬂow without encoding the control ﬂow as a data
value.
Separating the concerns of basic well-deﬁned behavior from information ﬂow
worked well in practice as this kept each proof more manageable. Merely starting
the information ﬂow proof with the assumption that the behavior was well-deﬁned,
however, was inadequate. The facts established during the safety proof at each in-
termediate point in the step function’s execution contained useful properties needed
during the information ﬂow proof. Inserting assertions into the code helped transfer
these facts to the context of the next proof. The operation assert p either leaves
the state unchanged (and returns the unit value) if the predicate p holds for the
program state; otherwise it transitions to the undeﬁned state. Discharging the extra
assertions is trivial since the inserted predicates readily follow from facts available
during the safety proof. The assertions strengthen the safety theorem so it also
implies all the intermediate properties asserted throughout the code. This transfers
the asserted facts to the information ﬂow proof.
5.2 Information Flow Policy
The information ﬂow model of this section is essentially Denning’s lattice-based
model [3], but with the weaker requirement of a partial order rather than a lattice.
Greatest lower bounds are useful for combining users or consumers of data, but the
ﬁle system never does this. While least upper bounds are useful for assigning labels
to combinations of data with diﬀerent labels, the ﬁle system never initiates the
combination of data items. Instead it only combines data at the request of a client;
for example, the server generates directory listings which refer to ﬁles of diﬀerent
labels. Although the client’s label may be greater than the least upper bound of
the labels in the directory listing (if such an upper bound exists), the client’s label
suﬃces.
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nonInterference :: “conﬁg ⇒ σ machine ⇒ (α, σ) m ⇒ bool”
“nonInterference c s x
≡∀obsL w t
.obsL < numLevels c
−→ w ∈ input-set c
−→ (∃u. outputEq c obsL
(runM x (purge c obsL w) u s)
(runM x w t s))”
theorem stepNonInterference
: “[[goodConﬁg c; goodState c s]]
=⇒ nonInterference c s (repeat n (step c))”
Fig. 3. Notion of Noninterference
Goguen and Meseguer’s notion of (transitive) non-interference [6] essentially cap-
tures the desired property and is widely accepted as a reasonable policy. Intuitively
two imaginary copies of the system run in parallel where one copy receives only a
subset of the inputs. The system respects Denning’s notion of information ﬂow if
for each label the outputs of both copies look the same from the viewpoint of an
observer associated with that label when one copy of the system sees only inputs
from labels less than or equal to that of the observer. That is, the output was not
inﬂuenced by allegedly unobservable inputs.
The formulation of a policy, however, depends on the representation of the sys-
tem to which the policy applies. While most existing notions of non-interference
assume an external stream of labeled events that repeatedly prod the system into
action, this work’s model of computation more closely matches that of a traditional
program. That is, the program executes without any external prodding and of its
own volition consumes input when it wishes. This meshes well with the interpro-
cess communication mechanisms and scheduler provided by the underlying real-time
kernel. Another diﬀerence is that the step function processes multiple requests from
multiple sources with diﬀerent labels.
These diﬀerences in the computational model require adjustments to the policy,
as shown in ﬁgure 3. Rather than dropping input actions that must remain unob-
servable, the purge function ﬁlters the input oracle so any input bytes read from
unobservable sources are zero. Conveniently, zeroing inputs to steps rather than
skipping steps ﬁts better with the simple scheduling algorithms found in real-time
kernels and also eliminates stuttering from the proofs.
In addition to adjusting the input oracle, the policy also adjusts the disk timing
oracle. The cause for the adjustment is that requests to read data causes a delay in
the processing of other disk requests. While the deployed system may rely on prag-
matic solutions to cover this delay, the model accommodates the issue by weakening
the policy. The purged execution trace may chose any arbitrary disk timing oracle.
Thus, the theorem says that any diﬀerences in system behavior could potentially
be caused by the disk drive running at an unusual speed.
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The theorem at the bottom of ﬁgure 3 states that the monadic computation that
runs the step function an arbitrary n times supports the non-interference property
at the top of the ﬁgure for the given initial state. The non-interference property
states that for any observer label obsL and input oracle w and timing oracle t if the
label is valid and the input oracle is valid, then running the monadic computation
from the start state on both the ﬁltered and unﬁltered input oracles sends the same
trace of outputs to observers with the given label.
6 Proof Technique
The structure of the information ﬂow proof is fairly typical, although it requires
some adjustment for the monadic framework. This section describes the proof
structure, the similarities to Ohe¨imb’s variation [13] of the unwinding lemmas, and
some key distinctions.
The predicate outputEq in ﬁgure 3 is not inductive. Thus, the ﬁrst step in the
proof is to strengthen the induction hypothesis. A stronger relation viewEq insists
not only the outputs are equal but the pieces on internal state which may eventually
indirectly inﬂuence the output must also be equal. Proving that viewEq is in fact a
stronger relation than outputEq is traditionally called output consistency. Deﬁning
viewEq as the conjunction of outputEq and a predicate on internal states makes this
proof trivial.
The viewEq relation is an equivalence relation. The fact that it is reﬂexive starts
the induction over two traces of states by asserting the initial state is viewEq to
itself. Higher-order logic supports Harrison’s technique of proving that for any
equivalence relation R, R x y = (R x = R y). This changes a custom equivalence
relation into Leibniz equality, which Isabelle’s simpliﬁer can then use to perform
equational rewriting with viewEq and automatically make use of symmetry and
transitivity.
The bulk of the work is proving that stepping both traces one step preserves the
viewEq relation. There are two common cases to consider. Either the monadic action
aﬀects only state that is observable and does not depend on any unobservable state
or the action aﬀects only unobservable state. The ﬁrst corresponds to Ohe¨imb’s
weak step consistency while the latter corresponds to local respect. One diﬀerence
is that while action-based frameworks case split on the level associated with an
external action, in this system the case split depends on (some argument to the
function that generates) the monadic computation or some piece of the state space
or both.
For the ﬁrst case where the action modiﬁes observable state, the proof decom-
poses the lemma over the monadic bind operation. The key is that in the observable
case, the values produced by the ﬁrst computation in each trace are Leibniz equal.
This causes the application of the second argument of the bind operator to produce
equal computations in each trace. This enables the proofs about the two subcompu-
tations of the bind operation to combine into a proof about the whole computation.
For the second case where the updated state is not observable, the proof reduces
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the reasoning to focus on only a single trace. The updated state in each trace is
viewEq to the state before taking the step. Thus, the equivalence of the ﬁnal states
of two traces follows from transitivity and the equivalence of the traces’ starting
states. Instantiating quantiﬁers is easier when there is only one expression in the
assumptions list of the proper type, so reasoning about each trace independently
improves automation.
7 High-Level Model
The process of designing the high-level model of the step function mentioned in
section 3 is somewhat interesting, but largely out of scope. This section highlights
a few techniques.
The initial design consisted of a direct-style program that reads a request, per-
forms the appropriate blocking I/O operation, waits for the response, and returns
the result. This program suﬀered from several problems. First, higher-order logic
cannot directly state the desired system property in terms of this interface. Second,
the program processes only one request at a time.
Inverting the control ﬂow [10] through continuation passing style [12] solves both
problems. Each formerly blocking I/O operation instead aborts the current contin-
uation and invokes a callback when the I/O completes. To handle multiple requests,
a continuation delimiter [4] surrounds the loop body. The delimited continuations
capture and abort only the loop body rather than the entire remaining compu-
tation. Thus, the program immediately continues with the next iteration which
initiates more asynchronous I/O requests. This, in essence, introduces cooperative
threading.
Another beneﬁt of inverting the program is that the I/O moves to the end of
the function rather than the middle. This aligns the boundaries of the step function
with the process’s time slice. Thus, the policy is in terms of observations made
when the program is blocked for I/O and other processes are running rather than
at some arbitrary point.
8 Low-Level Model
From the high-level model of the step function, judicious use of Isabelle’s equational
rewriting produces a lower-level model. While the high-level model is already close
to source code in a language with good support for functional programming, features
such as dynamic memory allocation present challenges for languages typically used
in systems programming.
Transforming the representation of the step function relies on a synonym for
equality “eqP ≡ op =” which delays the instantiation of schematic variables. Specif-
ically, folding the deﬁnition of eqP in the lemma “step = ?x” prevents the simpliﬁer
from immediately solving the goal by reﬂexivity.
A variety of optimizations are readily available “for free” just because the de-
velopment occurs within a theorem prover. Unfolding constant deﬁnitions performs
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enqueueCont :: “label ⇒ cont ⇒ unit m”
dequeueCont :: “label ⇒ cont option m”
Fig. 4. Enqueue and Dequeue Operations
both function inlining and constant propagation optimizations. The only mild issue
with inlining is that some deﬁnitions require η-expansion before the simpliﬁer will
use them. Rewriting with the monadic laws are almost free, since the proofs are
unproblematic and should be proven anyway.
Although assertions made facts proven during the safety proof available during
the non-interference proof, they serve no purpose in the implementation. Isabelle
easily removes the assertions via rewriting. Under the assumption that running
an assertion does not result in the unspeciﬁed error state, running the assertion
is equivalent to running return (). Isabelle can use this lemma along with lemmas
that assertion removal is compatible with the structure of the program syntax as
elimination rules in order to perform the desired syntax-directed program transfor-
mation.
The high-level representation of the step function contained two sources of dy-
namically allocated intermediate data structures, which Isabelle deforested in dif-
ferent ways. The ﬁrst was relatively straight forward, while the second involved
more eﬀort.
The ﬁrst structure represents incoming requests from the interprocess communi-
cation channels. The program bound the result of parsing the request to a variable
and then applied a function to the variable to process the request. The parser con-
sists of several nested conditionals which test for each possible variant of the request
structure. Each leaf of the tree of conditionals constructs the appropriate request
variant. The processing function ﬁrst case splits on the request variant and then
takes appropriate action. Inlining both functions and then distributing the pro-
cessing function across the parser’s conditionals replicates the processing function
n times where n is the number of variants. In this case, however, each replicated
instance of the case split is immediately applied to a (fully saturated) data con-
structor. Each of the n case statements then reduce to a single branch which is on
average 1/nth the size. Thus, the transformation decreases code size rather than
increasing it and also eliminates the dynamic construction of compound data.
The second dynamically allocated data structures represent work left to be done
after a DMA request completes. A na¨ıve implementation of the high-level model
would allocate such a structure and enqueue it just before sending a DMA request to
a disk. The processing of the structure occurs later when the DMA completes; the
structure construction and the structure destruction are in some sense far apart—
even in diﬀerent reactions.
To deforest the structures, consider the non-proper morphisms that operate on
the state space within the monadic type. Figure 4 shows the approximate type
signatures of the high-level model’s operations for enqueuing and dequeueing these
(defunctionalized partial continuation) structures. This interface to the queue data
structure suﬀers from a problem similar to that of the generic state monad men-
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enqueueContRead :: “label ⇒ ovecIndex ⇒ dvecIndex ⇒ label ⇒ nat ⇒ unit m”
“enqueueContRead qLabel ovecI dvecI responseLabel responseOﬀset
≡ enqueueCont qLabel (ContRead ovecI dvecI responseLabel responseOﬀset)”
enqueueContWrite :: “label ⇒ nat ⇒ unit m”
“enqueueContWrite label responseOﬀset
≡ enqueueCont label (ContWrite label responseOﬀset)”
queuePeekCont :: “label ⇒ cont option m”
“queuePeekCont l
≡ do tag ← queuePeekContTag l
;if readTag = tag
then do ov ← queuePeekContReadOutBuf l
;dv ← queuePeekContReadDvec l
;reqL ← queuePeekContReadReqLevel l
;i ← queuePeekContReadReqSlot l
;return (Some (ContRead ov dv reqL i))
else if writeTag = tag
then do reqL ← queuePeekContWriteReqLevel l
;i ← queuePeekContWriteReqSlot l
;return (Some (ContWrite reqL i))
else return None”
lemma dequeueCont-def2
: “dequeueCont l
= do k ← queuePeekCont l
;dequeueDropCont l
;return k”
Fig. 5. Modiﬁed Enqueue and Dequeue Operations
tioned by Chen and Hudak [1]. Speciﬁcally, the state representation inside the
monadic datatype contains references to values passed in from the outside. 2 Since
the interface to the monadic datatype fails to enforce linearity, the operations do
not model an imperative implementation. Transforming the interface eliminates
this diﬃculty.
The transformation to the monadic state’s interface involves rewriting the model
with the new queueing operations shown in ﬁgure 5. The top portion of the ﬁgure
deﬁnes new operations in terms of the old ones. The lower portion proves alternate
deﬁnition-like equations for the old operations in terms of the new ones. Substitut-
ing the new equations for the old operations throughout the program produces a
new program representation that uses only the new interface. Inlining the original
deﬁnitions for the queueing operations into the function bodies of the new opera-
tions updates the interface exposed by the monad.
2 Returning a reference to a value also poses problems.
P. Graunke / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 187–202198
int main()
{initState();
for (;;){
#include “step.c”
}}
Fig. 6. Implementation Main
This new interface to the state’s queues exposes only the components of the
structures, not the structures themselves. There is only ever one reference to each
structure, namely the reference from a node of the queue. The linear nature of
the references ensures the faithfulness of an implementation based on imperative
updates. Thus, the transformation eliminates the need to dynamically allocate new
structures when enqueuing.
While linearity eliminated one source of dynamic memory allocation, the trans-
formation introduced another. The wrapper equations in the lower half of ﬁgure 5
all allocate data structures. The location of the allocation, however, moved to a
diﬀerent portion of the code and occurs in a diﬀerent reaction. In fact, by mov-
ing allocation sites from enqueuing to dequeuing, the allocations are right where
the processing—and hence destructuring—of the data occurs. Isabelle’s equational
rewriting can now easily deforest the data structures.
9 Implementation
While proving that a model of a system enforces a desired policy eliminates certain
design ﬂaws, it does not guarantee that a deployed implementation behaves accord-
ingly. For this, the implementation must correspond to the model of the program
and the library code must properly implement the primitive monadic eﬀects. This
section describes the connection between the model and the source code. Section 10
discusses the primitives.
Isabelle’s meta language serves as a foundation for code generation. The meta
language—which is normally used to write tactics—can inspect the abstract syn-
tax trees representing the higher-order logic formulae and is also a general purpose
programming language. Since the low-level model of section 8 already looks like
imperative-style source code, the code generator simply traverses the abstract syn-
tax tree via pattern matching and recursion. At then end of the traversal the code
generator simply writes the resultant string to a ﬁle, which an existing C compiler
compiles. While C is not ideal for building reliable software, constructing a veriﬁed
or verifying compiler all the way to machine language was outside the scope of the
project. This may cause diﬃculties for an evaluation, since some organizations (such
as the United States Federal Aviation Administration) who perform evaluations of
C code require that the code to be tested using multiple compilers and that the
developers disassemble the object code and explain how it relates to the compiler’s
input.
The generated implementation corresponds directly to the low-level model of
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the step function. Even with the library that implements the monadic primitives,
this is not a complete implementation. A small amount of code must setup the
initial state and a loop must repeatedly call the generated step function. Figure 6
is essentially the main program.
10 Testing
What is the relation between proof and testing? Some people question the value
of formal methods, while others assume that proving software correct “once and
for all” eliminates the need for testing the software on speciﬁc inputs. This section
mentions the relation between testing and mathematical proof, two rationale for
testing, and the speciﬁc testing methods employed by the project.
Mathematical proof is based on deductive reasoning—deducing more complex
facts from presumably simpler ones. While deductive proofs provide value by both
reducing the complexity of and clarifying the assumptions, assumptions remain.
For the development presented so far, the most signiﬁcant remaining assumption is
that the abstract machine model of the non-proper morphisms matches the behavior
implemented by the hand-written C code, the C compiler, the separation kernel, the
microprocessor (hardware and microcode), and the peripherals. This layer requires
validation testing to ensure it matches the model.
Since testing is typically less expensive than formal proof, testing establishes
an acceptable level of assurance for less critical properties. For example, if the
system suddenly became as unresponsive as a brick then it would still succeed in its
primary mission of not leaking information. 3 This behavior, however, would likely
cause consternation for the users. Thus, the tests cover several basic correctness
properties. The correctness tests are unlikely to pass if the abstract machine is
broken; hence they cover validation testing also.
Haskell’s QuickCheck [2] tests extra assertions about the implementation. Al-
though the tool is designed to test Haskell programs, the test suite uses Haskell’s
foreign function interface to make interprocess communication requests that in-
teract with the block access controller implementation. By stating the property
in Haskell that writing an arbitrary block of arbitrary bytes and then reading it
produces the same block of bytes, QuickCheck automatically generates many ran-
domized requests and tests the implementation. Quickcheck also tests the property
that concurrently writing blocks with identical arbitrary bytes and reading blocks
from a diﬀerent interface with a greater label results in reading blocks with identical
bytes.
In addition to this property-based testing, the test suite also performs model-
based testing. For this eﬀort another model written in Haskell captures just the
functional behavior of the system. This model simply represents the disk as a
ﬁnite map of blocks of bytes, with read and write requests immediately performing
the corresponding actions (i.e. no delay due to DMA). A QuickCheck assertion
states that arbitrary sequences of arbitrary read and write requests processed by
3 The relative importance of these properties reﬂects the biases of the author’s particular clients.
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the implementation produce the same results as processing those same requests in
the Haskell model.
11 Future Work
The experience with this project was overall quite positive, but room for improve-
ment remains. The integration between the testing and veriﬁcation tools could have
been tighter. Model to implementation correspondence issues remain. Finally, this
section suggests a research challenge in modeling reactive systems.
While the primary model is in Isabelle, the testing model is in Haskell. This in-
volved recreating another (simpler) model in Haskell by hand. Eliminating this step
and testing directly from Isabelle would be preferable, both because of work reduc-
tion and also because it would strengthen the claim that the model was tested. The
Isabelle theorem prover includes a method named quickcheck which, like Haskell’s
QuickCheck, randomly generates test vectors. Isabelle, unlike Haskell implemen-
tations, does not include impure features such as foreign function interfaces which
the implementation testing relies upon. It may be possible to use Haftmann’s code
generator for Isabelle [9] to produce a matching Haskell model from the Isabelle
model, however, this was not available at the time.
The connection between the model and implementation remains less than ideal.
For one, the code generation automatically produces C code that looks syntactically
similar to the low-level model, but this is merely a syntactic translation. All the
claims about issues such as the store being linear remain informal. Producing ma-
chine code for a processor with a publicly available formal model, such as the ARM
processor [5] would improve the correspondence. A verifying or veriﬁed compiler for
a low-level language would ease the automation of such a task. Finally, the model
used natural numbers for unsigned integers. This resulted in an numeric overﬂow
error in earlier implementations. Modeling machine word arithmetic without Is-
abelle’s recently available machine word arithmetic library appeared prohibitively
painful.
The continuation passing style and defunctionalization transformations should
have been done either by a compiler or at least in a theorem prover rather than by
hand. If Isabelle could express properties about not only top level functions but
also about implicit continuations, the project could have potentially modeled and
reasoned about the program in direct style.
12 Conclusion
In summary, it is feasible to use modern interactive theorem provers such as Isabelle
to formally prove properties about low-level system software. Higher-order logic is
well-suited for embedding both other programming languages via monads as well
as logics customized for reasoning about the language’s constructs. Interactive
compilation through equational rewriting provides a nice mix between the control
of hand optimization and the convenience, maintainability, and reliability of fully
P. Graunke / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 187–202 201
automatic optimization. Our notion of non-interference supports programs with
non-inverted I/O and allows for variations in the timing behavior of peripherals.
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